[1] The Problem

In a c-span interview Tom Ridge observed that the limiting factor for homeland defense at this time was the pace at which technology could be developed. The implication was that Ridge and his newly formed department could do a more effective job of defending the US, if the pace of technology development could be accelerated. I take Mr. Ridge at his word. If the pace of technology development is the limiting factor for more effective homeland security, then it makes good sense that we do everything possible or at least practical, to speed up the pace with which homeland defense technololy is developed.

I know how to double the pace with which technology development takes place.

"Why write a blog?" one might ask. I write this blog, because I have no means of getting my knowledge into the brains of Tom Ridge and other decisions-makers in the Department of Homeland Security. My hope is that some of the readers of this blog have the means with which to alert Mr. Ridge et. al. of the possibilities. Once alerted, if Mr. Ridge is true to his word, I would expect him to take action and implement the changes that I discuss here.

What is the problem? The problem is that current pace of project completion is lethargic at best, for all defense contractors. If the nation's defense against terrorism depends in large part on our ability to complete defense acquisition projects, as Mr. Ridge states, then we're are at risk, and we will remain at risk unnecessarily for years to come.

Consider this. Whenever the decision-maker of a company feels the squeeze of the proverbial vice upon his more spherical organs, because some project is late, he (certainly not she if spherical organs are at risk) always responds by making the troublesome project priority-one for everyone whose paycheck requires his signature.

The effect of the step-increase in the priority of the troublesome project is that the project experiences two outcomes. First, the project is given all the resources that it can utilize effectively. Second, for each of the resources assigned to the project, newly assigned or not, the tasks of that project become of the highest priority. The result is that the project enjoys an outstanding level of focus; it virtually flies through the organization; and it is completed in record time.

So why can't all projects be completed just as fast? The answer is simple. After the pain-generating project is done, the decision-maker and his entire organization go back to business as usual. For defense contractors, business as usual means that the following polices and measurements are in full effect:

1) The most important measurement for all managers and all resources is the number of overhead hours accumulated by individuals, groups, and departments. This measurement is to be minimized at all times, or jobs are lost.

2) The number of active projects is determined not by the capacity of the organization but by the number of successful proposals, which almost always exceeds the capacity of the organization.

3) All active projects must demonstrate progress continuously.

So that we can understand the full depth of the problem, I will discuss in the next three articles how these policies limit the schedule performance of defense contractors today. In subsequent articles, I will discuss the policies imposed upon defense contractors by the government, which cause the defense contractors to live or die by the three policies above.